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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AS A RESTRICTION ON
STATE TAXATION
IN'l'RODUC'l'ION

N THE discussion of a topic of this nature, my purpose is to

restrict and not .to enlarge the field of available evidence. The
Iimmense
powers granted to Congress under the commerce clause
are too well known, and the magnitude of their extension by the
definition of the word "commerce" cannot be comprehended in a
restricted dissertation such as fhis. Thus, the· topic itself sets limits
to our .range. It concerns itself with the -existence of two powers,
the paramount congressional control over commerce and the state's
powers to tax. Both are inclined to encroach upon the prerogatives
of the other, and it is with an attempt to define that point where
the line has been and should be drawn by the courts that this essay
is written.
The commercial power has already been said to be paramount,1
and when it is exercised or when it is recognized to be exclusive
no power may bar its path. The right to taxation, also, if it exists,
is a right which in its nature acknowledges no limits. 2 Even when
it undeniably exists and rto restriction as a paramount power withdraws the subject from its regulation, the arbitrariness of the tax
or the rate or the method are all matters of legislative discretion.::
But taxation possesses a double nature, of revenue and regulation. In
this latter garb it is at odds with ·the commerce power when it deals
with subjects over which the Constitution has been granted an
exclusive control. This regulative nature of taxation was clearly
a recognized principle of the very earliest days. Madison in 1787
spoke of it as follows :
"The line of distinction between the power of regulating
trade and that of deriving revenue from it, which was once
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I.
Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449.
3 Delaware R R Tax, r8 Wall. 206; Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, r22

1
2

u. s. ~6.

RESTRICTION ON TAXATION

51

considered a barrier to our liberties, was found upon discussion to be absolutely indefinable."4
Its regulative power finds, perhaps, its strongest expression in Chief
Justice Marshall's dictum that the power to tax is the power to
destroy. 5 Thus we see the strength of the powers with which we
have to contend.
In a field such as this the validity of any tax is always determined by its effect, not by the manner in which it is laid. "A state
cannot do that indirectly which she is forbidden by the Constitution
to do directly." 6 So the rule is that its constitutionality depends
upon its effect on that subject whereon it is really laid. To make
a tax valid, it must also be shown that the subject itself is within
the jurisdiction of the state.7 The state power,. too, extends to all
things within its jurisdiction save to those which the Constitution
withdraws from its control,8 and these things are for us the subjects essential to the free flow of interstate commerce.
With these general principles in mind, we can now proceed to a
specific basis for discussion. For the purpose of clarity and exactness I have divided the general subject into six groups, which will·
be treated of under these distinctive headings :
I. The taxation of property in transit.
II. The taxation of persons in transit.
III. Privilege and occupation taxes.
IV. Discrimination.
V. The control of foreign corporations by the state and the
extent to which they receive protection by the Federal Government
under the commerce clause.
VI. The general power of the state to tax property and its relation to the commerce clause, including the mention of the miscellaneous powers of the state heretofore untouched.
4 Letters of Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787. Conf. Chatham's speech
in the House of Lords as given in Thackeray's LIF£ OF CHA'.l'HAM, vol. 2,
p. 281.
Ii McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316.
a Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283.
1 St. Louis v. Ferry Co., I I Wall. 423s McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316.
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TAXATION O:F PROPERTY IN TRANSIT

In the discussion of such a subject as the taxation of property in
transit, it is an axiom of constitutional interpretation that, because
of the nature of congressional power over commerce, in that it is
exclusive,9 property while in transit is untaxable.10 With this faet
assured as a working basis, it is necessary then to define when property can be said to be in transit, or can, in broader terms, be said
to be a subject of interstate commerce, in order that it may be possible to determine when the duration of federal protection under
the commerce clause withdraws the article from the operation of
the state power of taxation.
In general, it may be said that the doctrine voiced first in Brown
v. Maryland, 11 and finding its fuller expression in Welton v. Missouri,12 that the property must be protected from hostile state legislation until it has become part of the general property of the state,
namely, as long as it is iri transit, still holds, though modified in
meaning by subsequent interpretation. But when does this point in
all exactness occur? Chief Justice Marshall, in Brow1i v. Maryland,
attempted to define it by means of the "original package" doctrine;
but, though this principle is still valid when applied to imports from
foreign·countries, its application in interstate commerce was impossible of realization, and in application would have been unjust, and
it was finally discarded as a point by which to limit the right of the
state to tax,1 3 though it still has an important function in this field
of determining the boundary line of the state's police power.14 The
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. l.
Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. l.
11 12 Wheat. 419.
12 91 U. S. 275: "The power which insures uniformity of commercial
regulation must cover the property which is transported as an article of
commerce from hostile or interfering legislation until it has mingled with
and become a part of the general property of the country, and subjected like
it to similar protection and to no greater burdens."
1 3 American Steel and Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500; for its injustice
in practice see Mr. Justice Miller's opinion in Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall.
123: "But it is obvious that if articles brought from one state into another
are exempt from taxation, even under the limited circumstances laid down
in the case of Brown v. Maryland, the grossest injustice must prevail, and
equality of public burdens in all our large cities is impossible."
14 See Leisy v. Harden, 135 U. S. 100; and also the recognition of this
fact by Congress in the Wilson Act of 1890.
9

lo
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modem doctrine is to be anticipated in the case of Woodruff. v.
Parham,1 5 and comes to its consummation in the case of American
Steel and Wire Co. v. Speed.16
To begin at the beginning, an article cannot be in transit until it
is actually and physically so. It does not become an article of interstate commerce until it commences its final movement for transportation from one state to its destined point in another state.17 This
point occurs when it is committed to the care of a common carrier.
The question of the carrier is unessential as long as such carrier
has a continuous·communication with other carriers that extend the •
line of communication from one state to another.18 Hence the
mere intention of the producer or the manufacturer cannot put
this article in transit and place it within the pale of interstate commerce.19
Then, having once become articles of interstate commerce, they
remain so as long as they are i~ transit, until the property arrives
at its final destination or at some point of destination where it
awaits a sale.20 The passage of such articles through a state cannot be touched, even though their line of passage may not be the
most direct road to their destination.21 It is under the assumption
that any regulation such as taxation imposed by a state upon the
act of transportation is an attempt to regulate interstate commerce,
15 8
16

Wall.

192

123.

u. s. 500.

17 Coe v. Errol, n6 U. S. 517.
18 The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557. However, an exception is made in
regard to mere carts or other vehicles which transport the property only
to the actual depot. Also floating to the depot, as the floating of logs downstream to a point where they will be shipped by a common carrier, is within
this exception. Coe v. Errol, n6 U. S. 517.
19 Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. I, and Coe v. Errol, n6 U. S. 517; United
States v. E. C. Knight & Co., 156 U. S. I. Thus, in Larabee Flour Mills Co.
v. Missouri & Pacific Ry. Co., 74 Kan. 8o8, 88 Pac. 72, the mere intention of
the owner to use cars for transportation was not sufficient to make them
articles of interstate commerce.
20 Brown v. Houston, u4 U. S. 622.
2 1 Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. I.
(Sheep driven across the State of
Wyoming, though the route was not the shortest to their destination, were
held to be exempt from local taxation as property in transit, although they
subsisted partly by grazing on the roadside.)

54
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the exclusive nature of which in this department has been affinned,22
that this doctrine has its basis. Thus, when the transportation is
within or through a state or from one state to another, no tax or
regulation may be laid by the state on such transportation or "upon
the transporter because of such transportation" ;23 for the nature
of any tax is to be determined, not by the form or agency through
which it is collected, but by the subject upon which the burden is
imposed.24 The fact that the same burden is placed upon intrastate
transportation is wholly irrelevant. "Interstate commerce cannot
• be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid
on domestic commerce."25
So far we have considered property in continuous movement as
being in transit ; we now tum to the fact of temporary detention
as affecting the character of property in interstate commerce. The
facts of each particular case are actually decisive in coming to any
agreement of this sort, but certain general principles may be determined. If detention consists in the stoppage of transportation, due
-to storm, accident or act of God, such an act is unreservedly considered to have no legal effect upon the interstate character of the
commerce.26 Again, if this detention is due to the fact of convenience on the part of the carrier, and the property has not reached
its final destination, the interstate character of the property is not
lost. Thus, temporary detention of a dining-car does not make it
cease from being an article of interstate commerce ;2,7 or through
freight cars that were temporarily detained and left standing, and
not delivered to the consignee have not completed the interstate
22 "The rule has been asserted with great clearness that whenever the
subjects over which a power to regulate commerce is asserted are in their
nature national they may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require
exclusive legislation. (Citing Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299; Gilman
v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 42.) Surely, transportation of passengers or merchandise through a state, or from one state
to another, is of this nature. State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232.
23 State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232.
24' Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419.
25 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489.
26 I have been unable to find any case bearing upon this point, but this
is to be inferred from the general principles of jurisprudence as laid down
by Holland, 12th ed., p. 297.
21 Johnson -V. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 1g6 U. S. 1.

RESTRICTION ON TAXATION

55

transportation of property ;28 and the mere holding bf liquor for a
few days to suit the convenience of a consignee in paying for such
liquor and taking it away, does nof destroy the character of the
transaction as interstate commerce.20 An interesting and important
decision on this point was recently handed down by the Supreme
Court,30 where it was determined that in cases where the commodities are destined from one state to an.other, rebilling or reshipment
en route does not break the continuity of the movement, for the
essential character of commerce and not the accident of through
or local bills of lading character determines whether it is interstate
or intrastate.31 In all these cases it will be noticed that the fundamental idea is that of the continuity of commerce, while temporary
detention is allowable as long as the facts show that what is included
under the terms temporary shows a reasonable delay.32
We now come to the determination of the point which marks the
cessation of federal protection over the property-in fact, the point
when it ceases to be in transit and wl:iere the power of the state to
tax all subjects within its jurisdiction may be asserted. That the
original package doctrine does not apply3 3 has been stated above,
28 McNeill v. Southern Ry. Co., 202 U. S. 543, affirming Southern Ry.
v. Greensboro Ice and Coal Co., 134 Fed. 82. (Here the state could not
require cars loaded with coal, which were shipped in from another state, to
be switched to the sidetrack of a consignee, because they were subjects of
interstate commerce.)
20 Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 2o6 U. S. 129, reversing 87 S. W.
1n1, 27 Ky. Law Rep. log6. In accord is Adams ·Express Co. v. Kentucky,
2o6
139·
3o Western Oil Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U. S. 346.
s1 In this case the plaintiff shipped into the state a tank car of oil and a
carload of barrels. His agent, in order to fill the orders in the state, drew
the oil from the tank car into the barrels and made delivery at the same time.
The cars were filled, and were thence rebilled to another point in the state,
where the remainder were filled. The plaintiff's original intention was that
the ~ars should remain at the first place only long enough to fill the orders
from there, and should then proceed to the second point. This was held to
, be a continuity of commerce sufficient for interstate commerce.
s2 In Kelly v. Rhoades, 188 U. S. I, it was remarked that storage for
an indefinite time would subject the property in transportation to state taxation.
33 See the License Cases, 5 How. 504, where C. J. Taney recognizes the
distinction between the original package doctrine of Brown v. Maryland as
applied to foreign commerce and as applied to interstate commerce.

u. s.
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and the general test to be applied :is whether the property has actually
reached its destination or not. If so, it has ceased to be interstate
commerce and has been incorporated with .the general mass of property within the stat~. The construction of the commerce clause would
then maintain that in it no intention exists to prohibit the right of a
state to tax articles brought into it from another,34 when they have
reached their destination. Justice Miller examines the opposite doctrine and shows how injudiciously it would work to destroy the
rights of the state over its own subjects and commerce in the case
of W oo'druff v. Parhant. This destination is deemed to have been
reached when the goods are stored awaiting sale, as coal barges
moored in a river for sale after having arrived fro manother state.3 '
Such a tax, however, cannot discriminate ;36 it must be the general
tax la:id alike upon all property within the city. The tax then is not
placed upon the goods by reason of their coming within the state's
jurisdiction, which would constitute a regulation of commerce, but
by reason of their being within the state's jurisdiction not in transit
but as part of the general mass of property therein. The property
has actually acquired a situs there, and the law recognizes this fact.
Thus, property that is placed in storage for later distribution has
ceased to be in transit and is taxable, 37 whether it is later shipped
within or without the state.38 The court has ably recognized that
storage is in itself a business, and has a purpose outside the mere
Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123.
ss Brown v. Houston, II4 U. S. 622.
36 For discussion of this, see the portion entitled "Discrimination."
37 American Steel and Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500; Pittsburgh, etc.,
Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577 (coal in boats and barges moored in the
state and awaiting orders for further disposal thereof was held taxable);
Susquehanna Coal Co. v. Mayor of South Amboy, 228 U. S. 665 (coal was
stored at a point in transit for purposes of distribution. It was shipped to
a point in New Jersey, dumped there, and later transferred to bottoms as
occasion required. It was held that this was more than an incidental interruption of the continuity of commerce) ; General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S.
2n (here the oil was stored, after reaching its first destination, for distribution, and held taxable); Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 82
(logs were held in the river to be shipped as needed). See note in 52 L. ed.
755, dealing with this subject.
38 American Steel and Wire Co. v. Speed, supra; General Oil Co. v.
Crain, supra.
84.
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fransportation of the goods. 39 The protection of interstate commerce does not extend to the final sale of the product.40 The pause
for business conveniences, when adopting such a form, destroys
the interstate commerce character of the article.41 When the transit
of property is interrupted and the goods are held in the state for
the purpose of undergoing part of the process of manufacture, after
which they will again be shipped on, they are held to have a situs
there and are thus taxable. 42 Or when the pause for the business
convenience assumes some such form as the removal of the goods
from the cars, their redistribution and their reshipment, when this
point has been used constantly for this purpose, then the goods
have been held taxable.43 Facts which definitely interrtlpt the continuity of movement being established form a basis for the release
of the goods from the protection given them under the commerce
clause and their surrender to the taxing power of the state. In
general, it may be said that a study of the various cases embodying
this doctrine of transit and situs reveal reveals the fact that fair
and equitable considerations have led to the attitude taken by the
courts on their delineati9n of the principles underlying each case.
PERSONS IN TRANSI'l'

A brief excerpt, portraying. how the broader doctrine underlying
the protection of property in transit has been extended for the
same purpose to persons in tran,.sit to protect them from regulative
and revenue measures of tne states imposed through their taxation
powers, may not be out of place here. Though the term commerce
had been defined in its broadest terms by Chief Justice Marshall, 44
39 As in General Oil Co. v. Crain, siipra, and in Swift v. United States,
rg6 U. S. 375.
40 Banker Bros. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U. S. 2ro.
41 But see the borderline case on this question, Western Oil Refining Co.
v. Lipscomb, 244 U. S. 236, mentioned above.
4 2 Standard Oil Co. v. Coombs, g6 Ind. r79; 49 Am. Rep. 156.
43 Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504 (Here the grain was removed from
the car in transit for the purpose of inspecting, weighing and cleaning, and
then held taxable.) This overthrows the doctrine of State v. Engle, 34 N.
J. Law 425 (1871), when property in transit to market outside the state was
delayed merely for separation and assortment and held exempt.
44 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I : "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic,
but it is something more,-it is intercourse."

WILLIAM C. RUG
LAW LIBRARY

SYRACUSE UNIVER~
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the sweeping significance of his doctrine was not established by its
mere assertion, an~ for a time the Supreme Bench hesitated before
extending it from the meaning of the interchange of' goods, merchandise, or property of any kind to the transportation and transit
of persons.45 Thus, when the Port of New York passed a regulation requiring each captain of an entering vessel to report the number of passengers on board to the authorities, such a regulation was
upheld on the ground that commerce did not extend to persons and
these regulations then could not be repugnant to the exclusive nature
of congressional control over commerce.46 But later a state statute
placing a ta.x upon all persons coming from foreign countries was
held void and unconstitutional47 by a majority of the court,48 thus
reversing in part the former decision. The effect of this decision
is to be found in the famous case of Crandall v. N evada,49 though
here the decision rested upon the other grounds.50 Thus, there
seemed to have been some doubt in the minds of the court as to
where exactly this power over persons might be included, though
there was scarcely any doubt as to the fact that the national govern45 "Commerce * * * consists in interco'urse and traffic, including in these
terms navigation and the transportation and transit of persons and property,
as well as the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities." County of
Mobile v. '.Kimball, 102 U. S. 6g1. And its full expression is given in Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 352: "Commerce * * * embraces navigation, intercourse, communication, the transit of persons, and the transmission of messages by telegraph."
.
46The Mayor of New York v. Miln, II Pet. 102.
47 Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283.
~s C. J. Taney in his dissenting opinion upheld the right of the state toplace such a tax, refusing to admit the exclusive nature of the commerce
power, and holding that the question whether commerce included persons
was already settled by the cases of Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540; Groves
v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449; and Prigg v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
16 Pet. 539.
49 6 Wall. 35.
50 Namely, that an essential condition of the operation of constitutional
government was the right of free movement and transportation, and that the
Tight of the citizen "to come to the seat of the government to assert any
claim that he may have upon that government, to transact business he may
have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions," must be protected from any state aggression.
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ment possessed it.51 Justice Clifford maintained that it was to be
included under Article 4, Section 2 of the Constitution, in the privileges and immunities clause.52 Whether it springs from the sovereignty possessed by the national government or from its commerce
power can still be -said to be an open question, though the tendency
exists to regard the exdusiveness of the commerce power as a basis
for making void any regulative state restrictions, 53 while the sovereign powers possessed by the national government are regarded
as the source of the right of Congress to tax and exclude foreigners. 54
PRlvlLEGE AND OccuPA'rroN T.A:.XES

No restrictions, whether regulative or prohibitive, can be imposed
under the authority of any state upon transportation within the
scope of the commerce clause. These instructions usually take the
form of requiring the payment of a tax before commerce may be
indulged in, and are commonly known as licenses or privilege and
occupation taxes. As has been said before, a tax must be measured
not by the object upon which it is placed, but by the effect which it
produces ; and therefore these taxes when amounting to a burden
upon interstate commerce must be void because repugnant to the
e..'Cclusive nature of the congressional control over commerce.55 The
51 This power of the national government was upheld by the Alabama
Supreme Court in Joseph v. Randolph, 71 Ala. 499.
52 Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418.
53 As in People v. Compagnie Generate Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 59;
Henderson v. the Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259, and Chy Lung v
Freeman,_92 U.S. 275, and in Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois, n8 U.S. 557,
the transportation of persons from one state to another was deemed interstate commerce. This fact lay at the basis of the decision in Hoke v. United
States, 227 U. S. 3o8, which declared the White Slave Act of June 25, 1910,
constitutional; also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470; and Athanasan
v. United States, 227 U. S. 326; Bennett v. United States, 227 U. S. 333;
Harris v. United States, 227 U. S. 340. This transportation, moreover, does
not need to be limited to a common carrier. Wilson v. United States, 232
563.
5" In the top paragraph. Head Money Cases, II2 U. S. 580; Chinese
Exclusion Cases, 130 U. S. 581; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S.
6g8; United States v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279.
55 "No state can interfere with interstate commerce through the imposition of a tax, by whatever mzme called, which is in effect a tax for the
privilege of transacting such commerce." Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State
Auditors, 166 U. S. 185.

u. s.
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effect of such taxes is in general that of making the individual or
corporation pay for the privilege of engaging in su€h commerce in
the confines of the state. Thus, businesses which are actually interstate commerce themselves cannot be subjected to a tax. The business of transporting passengers. to and from or through a state is
untaxable as. a business, even though the same amount be levied on
the purely interstate business of the company.56 No license can be
required by a state for the privilege of conducting an express company carrying on the business of interstate commerce.57 Such a
privilege tax, similarly, cannot be exacted from a telegraph company
on condition of doing business in the state, although domestic as
well as interstate business is done, 58 for communication by business
is an integral part of commerce.59 However, a tax may be placed
exclusively on intrastate business, so long as this is not made a condition for its carrying on the interstate part of its business.60 Offices
of the agents of interstate commerce are untaxable when the only
business they solicit consists of purely interstate character.61 If
intrastate as well as interstate business is transacted at these offices
then they are taxable, 62 for in such cases they are at liberty to reject
the carrying on of the purely intrastate business. Hence a tax
placed upon the privilege of doing intrastate business solely is valid
when the company possesses the privilege of either continuing or
5 e Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., n7 U. S. 34, holding void a
tax placed upon sleeping cars employed by the defendant as a burden on
interstate commerce. To similar effect is Tennessee v. Pullman Southern
Car Co., n7 U.S. 51; also Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259, and Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283.
57 Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47; also Barrett v. N. Y. 232, U. S.
14; and Platt v. N. Y., 232 U. S. 35.
58 Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640.
59 Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., g6 U. S. l.
5 0 Postal Telegraph Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 6gz.
Even though the
intrastate business was done at a net loss. Williams v. Talladega ,226 U.
s. 404
61 McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, and Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. u4. This is also true as regards steamship lines,
as was determined in Clyde Steamship Co. v. Charleston, 76 Fed. 46. For
fuller discussion of this subject, especially with regard to its effect upon
corporations, see infra under the title of "Corporations."
a2 Pembina Consol. Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181;
also Attorney-Gen. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 188 Mass. 239.
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giving up this business.63 It is of no material difference to the case
that the intrastate business is a mere fraction compared with the
interstate part,64 or that it does not even pay for itself.65 This distinguishes these cases from the case of Leloup v. Mobile, ~entioned
above, in which there was no discrimination made in regard to interstate and intrastate commerce.
Similarly, a ferry company cannot be taxed for the privilege of
landing its freight and passengers in another state when it has its
situs within the first state ;66 nor can it be required to procure a
license for the privilege of carrying merchandise across a river
flowing between two states.61
Again, no state can require a license of a vessel which has already
been licensed by Congress under its rules and regulations for the
coasting trade. 68 An Alabama statute requiring such licenses was
declared void since Congress had already legislated upon the subj ect.60 And under no condition can such licensing regulate interstate
commerce,70 or be required as a prerequisite to the privilege of navigating a navigable stream within a state.71
The businesses which have so far been described are those which
63 Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650, when it was said that "the company cannot complain of being taxed for the privilege of doing a local business which it is free to renounce. Both parties agree that the tax is a
privilege tax." And to similar effect are Pullman Co. v. Adams, l8g U. S.
420, and Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 191 U. S. 171. In the latter
case, as well as the former, the company was free to renounce its intrastate
business, for under Section 3046 of Shannon's Tenn. Code the common-law
rule requiring innkeepers and passenger carriers to serve all people was
abrogated.
64 Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U. S. 420.
65 New York v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21.
66 Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, II4 U. S. 1¢.
67 St. Clair County v. Interstate Sand, etc., Transfer Co., 192 U. S. 454,
reversing in part W.iggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365. Or
between Canada and a state. Sault Ste. Marie v. International Transit Co.,
234 u. s. 333.
68 Foster v. Davenport, 22 How. 244
69 Sinnott v. Davenport, 22 How. 227.
10 Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69, where a license tax was made
the condition of owning and running towboats, and declared invalid. In
accord, Harmon v. Chicago, 147 U. S. 396.
11 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.
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are engaged strictly in transportation within the commerce clause i
but there remain other occupations which depend so wholly upon
commerce that they receive a similar protection. General merchandise brokers, who confine themselves entirely to soliciting orders
for principals resident in other states, and do local business, are not
subjected to a tax laid upon their receipts ;12 but if they also handle
local business they are subject to a commission and graduated sale
tax.1a
One important class of such businesses is to be found in agents,
peddlers, drummers and solicitors in relation to their protection
under the commerce clause. It is entirely valid for a state to lay a
tax upon such occupations, as are typified in general by such men,
as long as it does not interfere with interstate commerce. When
the agent traverses the state soliciting orders for a foreign place of
business, and then sends the orders of his customers to the foreign
place of business which ships the goods directly to the purchaser,
he is engaged in interstate commerce. The leading case upon this is
Robbins v. Shelby County Ta:Nng District,14 where the court ably
argued that a tax upon a merchant's soliciting orders might amount
to prohibiting him from selling in the state, prohibiting him, in fact,
from carrying on exactly such commerce as it was the intention of
the Constitution to protect. Thus, the general rule underlying all
such transactions may be briefly stated by saying when the company
ships upon previous contract of sale made by their agent, the occupation of, this agent is untaxable. ·The company may ship directly
to the purchaser,7 5 or to the agent, also upon previous contract of
12

Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U. S. 27.

n Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U. S. 1, and Nathan v.

Louisiana, 8 How. 73, where the broker was engaged in dealing with foreign
bills of exchange, which the court refused to regard as included in the term
commerce.
74 120
75

u. s. 489.

As in Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 38g, and Rogers v. Arkansas,
227 U. S. 401, declaring an Arkansas statute taxing all solicitors invalid in
so far as it applied to agents of this type. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v.
Sims, 191 U. S. 441, where a sewing machine was shipped into the state
on a previous contract of sale; Corson v. Maryland, 120 U. S. 502; Brennan
v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 28g; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507.
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sale, who delivers to the purchaser.76 Goods may be shipped C. 0.
D. by express, and the sale considered to have been actually made
at the home office and not in the state where the purchaser handed
over the purchase price to the express agent.77 A broad development and leeway for the action of the agent is to be found in the
"picture-frame cases." In these the agent received pictures and
frames shipped separately, for the purpose of convenience in ship-ment; they were put together by him and then delivered to the purchaser. No part of this transaction was held to be separable from
interstate commerce and it was thus untaxable.78 In another case the
customer was given the privilege of taking a frame at "factory
prices" when the picture was delivered,79 and in a third the agent
gave the customer an option of three different frames.w There
has been much confusion over the issue presented here, due to the
belief that the original package doctrine was thwarted. 81 It was
only after a long struggle that the c;ourts rid themselves of the original package as applied to interstate commerce82 and confined it to
foreign commerce alone,83 which we may hope will soon be abandoned. The great confusion arises because of failing to recognize
the fact54 that it has no bearing upon these cases, but that the fun16 Stewart v. Michigan, 232 U. S. 665, where the agent delivered from
carloads shipped on orders of purchasers.
77 Norfolk & \Vestem Ry. Co. v. Sims, 191 U. S. 441-"the fact that the
price was to be collected in North Carolina is too slender a thread upon
which to hang an exception of the trarisaction from a rule which would
otherwise declare the tax to be an interference with interstate commerce.
78 Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622. There was an element of
discrimination that entered into this case also, for the license tax of Greensboro applied only to the business of selling pictures and picture-frames by
non-residents.
10 Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U. S. 124
so Davis v. Virginia, 236 U. S. 6g7.
81 As in Rearick v. Pennsylvania, where brooms ordered by several persons were packed together for convenience of shipment and then the package broken by the local agent for delivery. The agent's business was held
to be untaxable. 203 U. S. 507.
82 See cases mentioned on this fact in "Taxation of Property in Transit."
83 Because of the impelling precedent of Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat.
419.
84 See, for ~nstance, Justice Holmes' opinion in Rearick v. Pennsylvania,
s11pra, where he attempts to pacify the demands of the doctrine and still
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damental idea underlying them is the "previous contract of sale
upon which shipment is then made from without the state."
There is a class of agents and drummers which must be distinguished from this former type. These are peddlers who sell foreign goods within a state directly to the purchaser, carrying about
with them such goods for sale. They are subjected to a general
tax on the occupation of peddling, for they are not engaged in interstate commerce.85 The same principle applies in those cases where
the agent solicits orders for goods from a foreign company, but the
company possesses a distributing warehouse within the state and
the goods are shipped from this point within the state to the purchaser who is also within the same state.86 In this instance it will
be noted that the transportation of the article to its final destination,
the part of the transaction which could be deemed commerce,
occurred wholly within the confines of the state and thus could at
most be intrastate commerce. I.t makes no difference whether the
goods were shipped from the distributing hous.e only upon order
by the home office, for still the commerce occurred within state lines.
In the former case, where the peddler sells foreign goods on hand,
maintain the division. Also the decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
in Loverin & Brown Co. v. Tansil, 102 S. W. 77, fails to recognize this principle. While in support of this doctrine, see the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Western Oil Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U. S. 346.
85 Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U. S. 95, where a manufacturer
of soft drinks has his goods brought into another state and there sold in
original packages in such quantities as they desire to purchase, it was held
that the business thus transacted is that of an itinerant peddler and may be
taxed by that state under a non-discriminating tax law without contravening
the commerce clause of the Constitution. To similar effect is Emert v.
Missouri, 156 U. S. 2g6, where legislation was upheld against peddlers carrying goods for sale with them.
86 Thus, in Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304, a license was
required of the agents who secured orders for machines, which were distributed upon these orders from the company's station within the state.
Likewise, in Howe Machine Co. v. Gage, l-00 U. S. 676, where an agent
offered for sale sewing machines which, though manufactured in Connecticut, were brought to a point within Tennessee and then shipped to purchasers upon this order. In this case the tax upon peddlers was levied upon
all peddlers of sewing machines, without regard to place of their manufacture, as the situation was construed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
See also Askren, Attorney General, v. Continental Oil Co., 252 U. S. 444-
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there is no commerce in the mere transaction of a sale. The interstate commerce has ceased 'with the arrival of the goods into the
hands of the peddler.
The law in regard to foreign commerce-that is, commerce with
foreign nations-still follows the "original package doctrine."
Articles while remaining within them cannot be taxed, and therefore no license can be requested of the importer or auctioneer of
original packages.87 The court seems to be burdened with this doctrine as regards foreign commerce, and because of the heavy precedent lying behind it must accede to it, though it is very evident that
an importer of goods from a foreign nation is enjoying a privilege
which is denied to the domestic importer. As to what is meant by
the term imports, it is definitely settled that the word applies only
to what is imported from a foreign country, 88 and not to what is
imported from another state. The corresponding idea is to be
attached to the word "export."89
DISCRIMINATION

Discriminatory state legislation seems so closely connected with
license taxes that the discussion of one necessarily implies the discussion of the other. Though, as it has been shown, discrimination
is not necessary to make invalid a restriction upon transactions within
the scope of the commerce clause, for interstate commerce cannot
be taxed at all, though the same amount be levied against domestic
commerce, 00 still discrimination when found to exist is declared
81

Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566; Brown v. Maryland,

12

Wheat.

419, is still the ruling case law.
88 Dooley v. United States, 183 U. S. 151 (imports and exports refer to
goods from and going to a foreign country only). Also, in Woodruff v.
Parham, 8 Wa11. 123, Mr. Justice Mi11er limited the word "import" to
duties on foreign imports, and the word "export" to something carried out
of the United States. He declared that any other meaning attached would
make the power conferred upon Congress a11owing it to lay and co11ect
imports nugatory by the subsequent clause of the ninth section forbidding
taxes on exports from any state, since an article cannot be exported from
a state without being imported into another.
89 For import as applied to persons, see section entitled "Transit of
Persons."
90 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 48g.
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repugnant to the idea of the commer-ce clause. The fundamental
idea underlying this protection against discriminatory legislation is
the "original package doctrine," namely, that no obstacle can be
placed by a state in the way of its mingling and becoming part of
the general property of the state.91 That this type of protection
was in the mind of the framers of the Constitution, and prompted
their giving the commerce power to the federal government, must
be admitted; but that in such cases, when transportation has long
come to an end and commerce has ceased to exist, discriminatory
legislation should be declared a burden upon commerce seems a
broad and inconsistent extension of the commerce clause. That it
is unnecessary is also true, for the same protection could be afforded
by the federal government under the immunities and privilege clause
of the second section of the sixth article of the Constitution92 or
under the equal protection of laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 93 as was done in several cases.94 However, it is sufficient to
note that the above attitude has always been strenuously maintained
by the courts. 95
Confining ourselves solely to discrimination embraced by the term
commerce, we notice that several types of such legislation have been
declared void. A state may not discriminate against the-products
of another state as such, or the business or occupation consisting in
111 "The power which insures uniformity of commercial regulation must
cover the property which is transported as an article of commerce from
hostile or interfering legislation, until it has mingled with and become a
part of the general property of the county, and subjected like it to similar
protections and to no greater burdens." Mr. Justice Field in Welton v.
Missouri, 91 U. S. 275.
9 2 "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states!'
oa "No state shall * * * deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of its laws."
ll 4 Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (Art. IV, Sec. 2), and New York v.
Roberts, 171 U. S. 662 (Fourteenth Amendment).
0 5 "It is sufficient to hold now that the commercial power continues until
the commodity has ceased to be the subject of discriminating legislation by
reason of its foreign character. That power protects it, even after it has
entered the state, from any burdens imposed by reason of its foreign origin."
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275. "No discrimination can be made by such
regulations adversely to the persons or property of other states." Robbins
v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489.
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the sale of these goods, which as a license tax is in effect a tax
upon the goods themselves. These license taxes differ from those
mentioned above, in that they are imposed upon persons peddling
or selling goods produced or manufactured without the state,
whereas no license is required for the same trade in regard to
domestic goods. 96 Similarly, a city, although it owns certain
wharves, cannot permit their use free of charge to all vessels landing
at them laden with products of its own state, and require a charge,
even though not in excess of reasonable compensation for the use
of the city's property, from all other vessels.97 A state may not
discriminate against foreign products or against the occupation of
selling them. 98 Again, a state may not tax patented articles so as to
discriminate against manufactures of other states.99 It cannot tax
property within the state which is the product of the soil of another
state, and at the same time exempt the property of its own produce.100
Inspection, also, when imposing an unnecessarily onerous burden
upon transportation, becomes discriminative and thus, invalid. This
has been applied to the inspection of meat, where the clear intent
of the statute was to tax meats coming in from other states and
exempt those meats slaughtered near by.101 Discrimination under
the guise of inspection out of the state was severely assailed,
although in the particular case the method and means of the statute
showed nothing apprehensive of discrimination, but solely an
attempt to improve the type of goods exported.102
96
Thus, in Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, was held void a license tax
upon peddlers of foreign goods. And in Walling v. Michigan, u6 U. S. 446,
Justice Bradley said: "None of the cases sustain the doctrine that an occupation can be taxed if the tax is so specialized as to operate as a discriminative burden against the introduction and sale of the products of another
state, or against the citizens of another state." In accord is Tiernan v.
Rinker, 102 U. S. 123.
111 Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434
98 Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566; Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 190
Mass. 355, 76 N. E. 955, when a license was required for peddling products
of foreign countries only.
99 Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 334
lOO In M. Darnell & Son Co. v. Memphis, 208 U. S. u3.
lOl Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313. In accord is Brimmer v. Ribman,
138
78.
102 Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 56.
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A difference merely in the method of collecting the tax on domestic products and foreign products is valid if no discrimination is
shown. Thus, an Alabama statute placing a tax on liquors, with
such an effect that the tax upon liquors manufactured in the state
was paid by the distillers and the tax upon foreign liquors was levied
upon those who sold them, was held valid.103
In all these cases discrimination will not be presupposed by the
court, although the discrimination is open to proof. It will accept the
interpretation of such act by the Supreme Court of the state as to
its application upon all business or merely that of a foreign
nature.104 From the facts as presented it attempts to work out a
solution which will not prove discriminatory and force the plaintiff
to forego his constitutional rights.105
CoNTRor, oF' ForutIGN CORPORATIONS BY THE STATE AND THE
ExTENT To WHICH THEY RJ;:cEIVE PRoTECTION BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UNDER THE COMMERCE Cr,AusE

This problem is one of the severest and most complicated which
confronts the lawyer today, and one that has for him many complex
relationships upon which the courts have as yet failed to formulate
an iron-bound rule. It is yet a question whether such a rule is pos·
sible, and if so, advisable, under present conditions of economic
advance. That the framers of the Constitution had no conception
of the growth of commerce under such corporate entities as are
today created by state and federal action seems certain,1° 6 and con·
sequently the development of the law on this question is wholly
due to the process of construction.
The corporation has always been looked upon by the law as a
creation of the state, and thus distinctions have been drawn between
such a creation and the individual. It is not a citizen within the
meaning of that clause in the Constitution107 which guarantees to
Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148; Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198
17.
1 0,i Howe Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676.
105 As was done in Reymann Brewing Co. v. Brister, 179 U. S. 445,
holding the Dow Law of Ohio valid.
100 See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437.
101 Article 4, Section 2.
lOa
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each citizen the privileges and immunities of the citizens of any
other state,1° 8 though under th~ "due process of law" clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment it is conceded that the corporation is a
person. 109 The general doctrine, then, that the court has laid down
is that, since a corporation is solely the creature of the state under
whose laws it is constituted, it possesses no such thing as a right
to do business in another state outside the limits of the jurisdiction
from whence it derives its powers. This right is thus transferred
into a privilege, for rights are not secured in other states by their
grant of corporate existence; but such privileges depend upon the
comity of the other state and its assent, such privileges as the right
to do business, the recognition of its corporate existence, and its
ability to secure the enforcement. of its contracts. 110 The state can
give its assent in many ways, but the commonest way, and that with
which we are concerned, is the payment of a tax which is made the
condition precedent to its doing any business whatever within the
state, or to the right of maintaining proceedings in the courts of the
state. A state can then go so far as to prohibit the transaction of
business therein by a foreign corporation, or niake such business
possible only upon payment of the above-mentioned tax.1 n There
is no provision then which forbids a state. from discriminating
between its own corporations and those of another state.112
There are, however, distinct limitations to this broad doctrine.11s
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. I68; Blake v. Mc Clung, I72 U. S. 239.
Paul v. Virginia, supra.
110 Paul v. Virginia, supra.
111 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. I68; Liverpool Insurance Company v.
Massachusetts, IO Wall. 566; Ducat v. Chicago, IO Wall. 410; Philadelphia
Fire Association v. New York, n9 U. S. uo; Hooper v. California, I55 U.
S. 648; Nutting v. Massachusetts, I83 U. S. 553; Security Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, I65 U. S.
578; Hom Silver Mining Co. v. New York, I43 U. S. 305.
112 Ducat v. Chicago, IO Wall. 410.
113 The broad nature of Paul v. Virginia has been a subject of great
dispute, and the court has cautioned its appellants from attempting to interpret it too broadly. The chariness of the court to accept this doctrine in
full is to be seen in Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, where, in speaking
of Paul v. Virginia, the learned judge said: "The general language of the
learned justice is to be expounded with reference to the judgment before
him."
.
10s
109
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They are in the main three, of which two only will be discussed at
present It does not apply to corporations which are engaged in carrying on interstate commerce, and secondly to corporations in the
federal employ.114 This business must, however, be strictly interstate commerce, and the term carrying on intersfa.te commerce is
limited to act~ of such corporations as common carriersm and telegraph companies,116 and such others who actually afford facilities
whereby commerce is carried on between the states.117 It does not
include manufacturing118 and trading companies making interstate
114 Justice Field, the same judge who delivered the opinion in Paul v.
Virginia, pointed out these two exceptions in very specific language in Horn
Silver Mining Company v. New York State, 143 U.S. 305. The same exceptions are pointed out in Pembina Silver Mining and Milling Company v.
Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181.
115 Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. u4;
McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104; Pullman Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman,
216 U. S. 56; Fargo v. Stevens, 121 U. S. 230; Clyde Steamship Co. v. City
Council of Charleston, 76 Fed. 46.
116 Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., g6 U. S.
1. The state may tax the property of the telegraph company within its own
borders as a: tax on property (Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taggart, 163
U. S. 1), provided that such a tax is not so arbitrary as to operate as a
privilege tax (Com. v. Smith, 92 Ky. 38). But for reasonable expense for
inspection and regulation the' state may go so far as to impose a pole and
wire tax (Philadelphia v. Western Union Tel. Co., 82 Fed. 7':Jl).
117 This applies to express companies doing an interstate business (U.
S. Express Co. v. Hemmingway, 39 Fed. 6o), but not to insurance companies,
whether :fire (Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168), or marine (Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648), or mutual life insurance companies (New York Life
Insurance Company v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389) ; also, it does not apply to
pipe-lines engaged in interstate transportation (Tide Water Pipe Co. v.
State Bd. of Assessors, 57 N. J. L. 516).
11s This distinction is no doubt due to the fact that the court has always
recognized the distinction between mere manufacture and commerce, and
has maintained the fact that manufacture is not an essential part of commerce; as see the United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. I, and Kidd
v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1. See also, in distinct relation to above question,
Diamond Glue Co. v. U. S. Glue Co., 187 U. S. 6u, where a foreign corporation entered into a contract within the state for the erection of a factory where the product should be manufactured, and the fact that this
product was destined· for use outside the state was held not to exempt the
foreign corporation from compliance with the state statutes In accord is
Capitol City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238.
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shipments. This attitude is, of cour?e, due to the fact that the
right to regulate interstate commerce is of an exclusive nature and
it can brook no interference from the several states. The question
whether the· business of such corporations is within the meaning
of the commerce clause interstate commerce is one of fact and is
to be determined by the proper tribunal.119 Thus, there can be said
to be no essential difference as to the validity of a tax on interstate
commerce, whether such commerce is carried on by an individual
or a corporation,120 and the same rule of law holds for both.
The same regulation holds for corporations engaged in the federal employ. Its growth is to be traced from the principle first
enunciated in McCulloch v. Maryland, 121 that the tax on such a
corporation is in its essence a regulation of the agencies of the federal government by ·the state and may mean the destruction, or at
least the subordination of the federal government to state jurisdiction. Thus, corporations engaged in the execution of contracts
for the federal government have been protected from state interference or control.122 Corporations organized and created by federal law are also immune from state regulation, but as such corporations are usually created for the purpose of carrying on interstate commerce exclusively under the power given the federal government under the commerce clause, these corporations would be
governed by the rule of law applied to the first class of corporations
just mentioned.
We can then sum up the power of the state over corporations of
t~is class by stating that it does not extend to the power of exclusion or of the imposition of conditions upon the transaction of their
business within the state, but the state can only tax such portion
of their property which is situated or employed within the state.123
The third limitation upon the power of a state by taxation or
otherwise to control a foreign ~~rporation rests upon the interpreOakland Sugar Mill Co. v. Fred W. Wolf Co., n8 Fed. 239.
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. lg6.
121 4 Wheat. 316.
122 U. S·. to use, etc., v. Fidelity Guaranty Co., 178 Fed. 721, Cir. Ct. E.
D. of Penn.
1 2 3 For a discussion of this topic, see portion of this article under the
title, "Taxation of Property."
110
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tation of what is meant by the phrase "doing business in the state."
If this business is in itself a transaction of interstate commerce,
the corporation has been held to be exempted from the necessity
of qualifying according to the state regulations, and the courts
have held that it "is not doing business" within the meaning of
such acts. As to what constitutes a transaction of interstate commerce, and where and how the line between such transactions and
the ordinary fact of "doing business" can be drawn, is a matter
of perplexing difficulty and the law can only be laid down by a
review of federal and state decisions on the subject. Thus, a single
act or transaction by a foreign corporation in another state has been
construed as an act of interstate commerce, and for such a purpose
the corporation is not compelled to register according to state law
so as to enforce the execution of its contracts.124 Such a single act
constitutes a sale by a corporation to a person within the· state, and
thus establishes the relationship of vendor and vendee between the
corporation and its customer. It will be not.iced that this doctrine
finds its basis in that of Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland, 125 namely, that the power to regulate commerce must be
capable of authorizing the sale of those articles which it introduces.
124 It was upon this basis that a single act of business could not be said
to be carrying on business that the Cooper Manufacturing Company was
upheld in its contention that it could secure the enforcement of a contract
by which it had sold machinery manufactured in New Jersey to a firm in
Colorado, although it had not complied with the state regulations. Cooper
Manufacturing Co. v. Ferguson, II3 U. S. 727. The concurring opinion of
Justices Matthews and Blatchford construed such interference by the state
as an interference with interstate commerce (n3 U. S. 736, 737), and thus
foreshadowed the present tendency in regard to such acts. Thus, in Alpena
Portland Cement Co. v. Jenkins & Reynolds Co. (1910), 244 Ill. 354. 91 N •
. E. 480, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a single transaction within
the state by a foreign corporation does not constitute doing business within
the meaning of the foreign corporation act. The same attitude was taken
in Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Hays, 182 Mo. App. u3, 168 S. W. 239; in
Hildreth Granite Co. v. Freeholder of Hudson, 87 N. J. Eq. 316, 100 Atl. 158;
in Vermont Farm Machine Co. v. Ash, 23 N. Mex. 647, 170 Pac. 741; in
Fuller v. Allen, 46 Okla. 417, 148 Pac. 1008; Oregon Commercial Bank v.
Sherman, 28 Ore. 573, 43 Pac. 658; Barse Live Stock Company v. Range
Valley Cattle Co., 16 Ut. 59, 50 Pac. 630; Weiser Land Co .v. Bohier, 152
Pac. 869.
1 2 5 12 Wheat. 419.
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Therefore, it follows that since the states have no power to prohibit
the introduction of an article they can also place no restrictions upon
its sale. It is immaterial whether the person introducing and then
selling such articles is natural or artificial, an individual or a corporation, so long as such person is engaged in the prosecution of
commerce among the several states.126 This sale, however, must
be wholly incidental to and necessary to the fact of importation.
Importation must occur as a consequence of sale; and thus, in other
words, acts done upon previous contracts of sale which involve
transportation from without the state constitute interstate commerce
and as such cannot be construed as "doing business" within the
meaning of any such regulative state acts.127 This principle extends
not only to the sale of the products of the corporation but also to
such acts which are construed to be interstate commerce, such as
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, II4 U. S. lg6.
Thus, a contract made in Arkansas for the purchase of books to be
shipped from Tennessee and resold in Arkansas does not bring the corporation under the ban of the statute prohibiting a foreign corporation from
doing business in Arkansas without obtaining permission. Robertson v.
Southwestern Co., 136 Ark. 417, 2o6 S. W. 755. The connection between
transportation and sale is clearly brought out in London v. Public Utilities
Commission, 234 Fed. 152, when such transportation and sale by a Delaware
corporation of natural gas procured in Oklahoma and delivered in Kansas
and Missouri was construed as being interstate commerce. In Dinuba Farmers' Union Packing Co. v. J. M. Anderson Co., 193 Mo. App. 236, 182 S.
W. 1036, a California corporation sold raisins to a St. Louis Grocery Company through a selling agent in San Francisco and a broker in St. Louis,
and such transaction was held to be interstate commerce. Again, goods sold
f. o. b. at a point outside a state to be shipped to a buyer within the state,
who sells them at: retail, cannot be held to be doing business. J. R. Watkins
Medical Company of Winona, Minn., v. Coombes, 166 Pac. 1072. Again,
carrying merchandise from Texan ports to foreign ports constitutes foreign
commerce. W. B. Clarkson Co. v. Gans S. S. Line, 187 S. W. no6. In
Chase-Hackley Piano Co. v. Griffen, 149 N. Y. Supp. 998, it was decided
that a foreign corporation which simply consigns goods to merchants for
sale, the contracts being subject for approval of the corporation in another
state, is not doing business in New York. "The act that local dealers sell
the goods in their own names, under conditional sale agreements, and then
assign such contracts to the corporation, which retains title until the entire
purchase price is paid, and collects the installments through its agents in
New York, is a mere incident to interstate commerce." THE CoRPORA'l'loN
JouRNAL, No. 46.
1:2 6
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the execution of a mortgage deed of trust outside of the state128
by one foreign corporation to another foreign corporation, covering
real property within the state; executing a mortgage within a state
on property within that state to secure an indebtedness to a foreign
corporation ;129 taking a single assignment of an instalment contract
for the sale of a piano ;130 the giving of notes for indebtedness by a
foreign corporation ;131 collection of a debt or taking a mortgage to
secure it ;132 taking subscriptions to its own stock ;133 the bringing
of a suit by a national bank in the courts of the state ;134 ; the mere
~ct of holding real estate ;135 acting as a stockholder in a domestic
corporation.i.a 6 These acts determine their nature wholly from the
facts of the case, and it will be observed that the acts fall either
into the class of transactions which constitute interstate commerce
or into a class which involves no active participation in business but
constitutes either sole possession or mere passive ownership.
It is now but a step from a transaction between the corporation
and another person establishing the relationship of vendor and vendee to that of where an intermediary position is occupied by an
agent of the corporation. The principle underlying the drummer
12s

Continental Trust Ci:>. ·v. Tallasee Falls Mfg. Co., 222 Fed. 6g4
Covey Cotton Oil Co. v. Bank of Ft. Gaines, 15 Ala. App. 529, 74 So. 87.
130
Bullfrog, Goldfield R. Co. v. Jordan, 174 Cal. 342, 163 Pac. 40.
131 Plew v. Board, 274 Ill. 232, n3 N. E. 603.
1 3 2 Ichenhauser Co. v. Landrum's Assignee, 153 Ky. 316, 155 S. W. 738.
l,33 Hauger v. International Trading Co., 184 Ky. 794, 214 S. W. 438, and
Denman v. Kaplan, 205 S. W. 739 (Tex. Ct. App.).
134 Hieston v. National City Bank of Chicago, 132 Md. 389, 104 Atl. 281.
1a 5 Broadway Bond St. Co. v. Fidelity Printing Co., 170 S. W. 394- But
see Donaldson v. Thousand Springs Power Co., 29 Ida. 735, 162 Pac. 334,
where taking title to real estate in behalf of a corporation was considered
to constitute doing business. In accord with the former case is the opinion
of the Attorney-General of North Carolina in his biennial report, p. 83·
(cited from THE CoRPORA'l'ION JOURNAL, No. 51). Where the chief purpose
of the corporation is that of taking over land already bought, such a transaction, even if single, was deemed to be the doing of business. Weiser Land
Co. v. Bohier, 78 Ore. 202, 152 Pac. 86g.
136 Toledo Traction, etc., Co. v. Smith et al. (U. S. District Court), 205
Fed. 643, but the opposite view was taken when the section of such stock
amounted to a controlling interest. Central Life Securities Co. v. Smith, 236
Fed. 170.
129
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cases as enunciatedjn Robbins v. Shelby County Ta:t:ing District1137
seems to be developed with full force in this field. As long as this
agent retains the character of a solicitor or drummer for this corporation, in which he secures orders for the goo.ds of this corporation,138 which are then shipped either directly to the customer139
or to him, only upon his order, to be delivered to the customer,140
such transactions are considered to be essential to and a part of
interstate commerce and the corporation -cannot be forced to comply with state regulations on the ground that it is "doing business"
within the state. It is of no consequence to this ge~eral principle
that the agent may carry with him a stock of samples so as to promote and facilitate sales,141 or even when the corporation may go
so far as to maintain an office where records may be kept and a
competent office force employed, provided that no orders are filled
directly from such office but from the -corporation's factory, the
office then being considered as a part of the complete transaction
137

120

u. s. 489.

Mere solicitation of business by agents does not constitute doing
business. Pembleton v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n, 28g Ill. 99, 124 N.
E. 355; Am. Contractor Pub. Co. v. Michael Nocente Co. (Sup. Ct. App.
Div., First Dept.), 139 N. Y. Supp. 853 (where an office was kept for the
purpose of collecting news and soliciting contracts for advertisements) ;
McDowell v. Starobin Electrical Supply Co., Inc., 104 Misc. 596, 172 N. Y.
Supp. 221; Loeb v. Star and Herald. Co., 187 App. Div., 175 N. Y. Supp. 412;
Fruit Dispatch Co. v. W. B. Wood and RH. Wood, etc., 42 Okla. 79, 140
Pac. n38; Bertin & Lepou v. Mattison, 69 Ore. 470, 139 Pac. 330; DunnSalmon Co. v. Edwards, 6o Pa. Sup. Ct. Rep. 340.
1a11 Morrisville Trust Co. v. Bayer Steam Soot Blower Co., 166 Ky. 744
179 S. W. 1034; Badische Lederweike v. Capitelli (N. Y. Sup. Ct. Fulton
County), 92 Misc. 260, 155 N. Y. S. 651; International Text Book Co. v. Tone,
220 N. Y. 313, II5 N. E. 914 (where the product shipped consisted in instruction by correspondence); this was made the ruling case law by the decision
of the U. S. Supreme Court in International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217
138

u. s.

91.

City of Lee's Summit et al. v. Jewel Tea Co., 211 Fed. 965 (agents
held not to be subject to license taxes on vendors imposed by local ordinances); Western Oil Refining Co. v. Dalton, 131 Tenn. 329, 174 S. W. 1138
(oil shipped in tank cars).
141 M. E. Smith & Co. v. Dickenson et al., 81 Wash. 465, 142 Pac. u33
(where agent had an office at which he exhibited samples); Larkin Co. v.
Commonwealth, 172 Ky. 1o6, 18g S. W. 3 (where company advertised its
goods by "traveling showrooms").
140
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of interstate commerce.142 This office must, however, handle only
such business as is wholly inter~tate in character, and may not participate in such intrastate business as will result in its becoming for
all purposes a branch office with the same powers as the main seat
of the corporation.143 The procedure which those offices which come
within the law must in general adopt is that all contracts which they
make with the consumer are to be executed subject to approval by
the home office.
Agents and offices of transportation companies are in all cases,
when their object is that of soliciting trade for their business,
engaged in interstate commerce, and as such are immune144 from
the necessity of conforming to the state regulations.
When the office of the foreign corporation partakes of the nature
of a warehouse which stores goods ready for shipment on the order
of the customer and not on a previous contract of sale, the corp0<
ration is then considered to be doing 'business within the state.141
It is of no material difference whether the title is to remain in the
corporation until bona fide sales are made in the due course of busi·
ness.146 The principle here has a substantial basis, for the points
of shipment from the warehouse to the consumer lie wholly within
the state, and the mere intent of the home office to ship to the con·
sumer cannot be considered to place the article within the control
of Congress as interstate commerce,147 and thus the goods while
14 2 Cheney Bros. Co. v. Commonwealth, 218 Mass. 558, 106 N. E. 310,
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the U. S. in 246 U. S. 147; also see other
cases in the same report of the U. S. Supreme Court affirming the same
principle.
1 4 3 See 246 U. S. 147; also Electric Specialties Co. v. Rosenbaum, 102
Misc. 520, 169 N. Y. Supp. 157.
144 Vicksburg S. & P. Ry. v. De Bow, 148 Ga. 738, 98 S. E. 381; Takacs
v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 228 Fed. 728; Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co.
v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264; Erie Beach Amusement, Limited, v. Spirella Co.,
Inc., 173 N. Y. Supp. 626, 105 N. Y. Misc. 170; Phila. & Gulf Co. v. Clark,
59 Pa. Sup. Ct. 415 (steamship company).
145 American Car Co v. Grasse Contracting Co., 102 Misc. 230, 168 N.
Y. Supp. 689. But see Mitchell Wagon Co. v. Poole, 235 Fed. 818, which
holds almost opposite.
146 E. A. Lange Medical Co. v. Brace et al., 186 Mich. 453; 152 N. W.
1026; Bailey v. Parry Mfg. Co., 59 Okla. 152, 158 Pac. 581. /
147 Coe v. Errol, n6 U. S. 517.

RESTRICTION ON TAXATION

77

detained at the warehouse must be considered to have lost their
character of articles of interstate commerce.148
The agent also cannot dispose of goods shipped to him in ordi·
nary retail, whether in original packages or not.149 This principle
applies in such cases where the agent has the goods with him at
the time when the contract is made and then disposes of them to
the customer.10<> The agent is also forbidden to dispose of any
samples that he may have with him, as such action constitutes the
doing of business. In cases where the agent takes the title of the
goods and resells, the transaction in which the corporation is concerned is terminated with the disposal of the goods to the agent,
which transaction constitutes interstate commerce, and therefore
when the agent again sells the goods the corporation is not doing
business within the state. Such agents, however, may not resell as
if they were acting for the corporation, and are not permitted to
use the name of the corporation for the purpose of promoting their
trade.151
There is one principle upon which the various decisions reveal
much complexity, namely, when the agent of the foreign corporation has goods consigned to him which he retains and then sells, but
the selling is done upon a commission basis. The agent generally
has no authority to bind the company by warranty or otherwise,
and no sale is considered to be valid until approved by the home
office, while the title of goods remains with the corporation until
sale.152 Such a method of sale on commission has been in general
construed by the courts as not "doing business" within the state
and such corporations have not been required to conform with the
state regulations in order to secure the enforcement of their con1 4 s This follows out the basic idea underlying Brown v. Houston, II4
U. S. 622, and American Steel and Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500.
149 J. R. Watkins Medical Co. v. Williams, 124 Ark. 539, 187 S. W. 653;
Wilson & Co. v. Bazaar, 168 N. Y. Supp. 188.
1 5 0 Miellmier v. Toledo Scale Co., 128 Ark. 2u, 193 S. W. 497; Jenkes
v. Royal Baking Powder Co., 131 Minn. 335, 155 N. W. 103; Prigge v. Selz,
Schwab & Co., 134 Minn 245, 158 N. W. 975.
101 Shores-Mueller Co. v. Palmer, 216 S. W. 295.
152 As were the conditions under which Waltman & Bryant of Oklahoma
sold the defendant's cars in Osage County, Oklahoma, in the case of Auto
Trading Co. v. Williams, 177 Pac. 583.
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tracts.153 That such an arbitrary distinction should be made, by
which the transaction can still be deemed to come within the pale
of interstate commerce, seems unnecessary. The principle that the
goods, when having reached their final destination, which in this
instance can be no more than the destination to which they were
consigned, have ceased to be articles of commerce, should apply,
and the fact that a commission basis is the sale arrangement cannot
extend the character of an article of commerce to a greater degree.
This fact that the courts have failed in all its fullness to recognize,
namely, that interstate commerce should be an unbroken transaction
from vendor to vendee, and such vendor and vendee must be situated in different states, has led to the greatest diversity in decisions
on this question.154
If the agent goes so far as not only to deliver the product, which
is consigned directly to the consumer, but also to install such product, the corporation is then "doing business" within the state. This
installation is held to be an act intrastate in character and to be a
part of local business, attempting, as it does, to make the articles of
interstate commerce a part of the state property. Such a view as
this was taken by the Supreme Court,155 although it hinted that in
some cases, because "of some intrinsic and peculiar quality or inherent complexity of the article, the making of such agreement was
153 Eastman v. Tiger Vehicle Co. (Tex. C. App.), 195 S. W. 336 (where
products were shipped and sold during a fair by agents upon a commission
basis and the corporation was not forced to secure a permit) ; J. J. Cooper
Rubber Co. v. Johnson, 133 Tenn. 562, 182 S. W. 593 (where automobile tires
were shipped to a local company for sale on a commission basis) ; Auto
Trading Co. v. Williams, 177 Pac. 583 (for facts, see supra). Cases which
adopt a reverse viewpoint are Grams v. Idaho Nat. Harvester Co., I05 Wash.
002, 178 Pac. 815 (where a harvester company placed with a warehouse
company a list of parts for sale on commission to purchasers 0£ machines,
the articles being sold as the harvester company's); Farrand Co. v. Walker,
16g Mo. App. 602, 155 S. W. 68 (good~ shipped on consignment to agent and
sold on commission by him, but if goods are wrongfully retained by the
agent the corporation may prosecute an action of replevin or trover against
bim).
154 As see note immediately preceding.
155 Browning v. City of Waycross, 233 U. S. 16 (where the installation
0£ lightning rods accompanied their sale).
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essential to the accomplishment of the interstate transaction."156
Thus, if the installation can be satisfactorily accomplished and completed by local workmen, and special and technical knowledge is
wmecessary for the purpose, the corporation, if it proceeds with
such actions, is "doing business" within the state.1~
In summing up these principles, it may well be said that any corporation can send its commercial travelers soliciting sales through
other states and may ship goods to purchasers, and such business
cannot be interfered with by the- state. Such interstate commerce
does not constitute a "doing of business" within the state. Again,
a foreign corporation which has no warehouse, office or place of
7

1 55 Browning v. City of Waycross, 233 U. S. I6. Thus, in Power Specialty Co. v. Michigan Power Co., Igo Mich. 699, I57 N •W. 4o8, the case
was sent back for a new trial, as there was no evidence before the court
as to whether this work could be done by the purchasers through local
workmen. The work consisted in the installation of six superheaters in a
power plant in Lansing. The Supreme Court of Michigan adopted the same
test of "intrinsic or peculiar quality or inherent complexity'' as a guide to
the question of installing a ventilating system, in B. F. Sturtevant Co. v.
Adolph Leitelt Ironworks, I96 Mich. 552, I63 N. W. I3. Installation of a
soda fountain was considered a reasonable incident of sale so as to constitute a single act of interstate commerce, in Puffer Mfg. Go. v. Kelly, I98
Ala. I3I, 73 So. 403. See also Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Buckhett, I4 Ala. App.
5II, 71 So. 82. The erection of a pumping plant was held to be an incident
of interstate commerce, ~n Dempster Mill Mfg. Co. v. Hamphires, 202 S.
W. 981 (Tex. C. App.). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin took a very
broad view in S. F. Bowser & Co. v. Savidaskey, I54 Wis. 76, 142 N. W. 182,
where it held that the assembling and installing of machinery were merely
incidents of interstate commerce.
151 B. F. Sturtevant v. Adolph Leitelt Ironworks, Ig6 Mich. 552, I63 N.
W. I3 (installation of ventilating system in defendant's plant; In re
Springfield Realty Co., 257 Fed. 785 (installation of automatic sprinklers);
Phillips Co. v. Everett, 262 Fed. 341 (installation of automatic fire
sprinklers); Ensign v. Christiansen (N. J. Sup. Ct.), Iog At!. 857 (installation of lighting plant) ; Buhler v. E. T. Burrowes Co., l7I S. W. 791 (installation of screens by agent); York Mfg. Co. v. Colby, 172 S. W. 2o6 (installation of ice manufacturing plant) ; Peck-Hammond Co. v. Hamilton Inde·
pendent School Dist., I8I S. W. 697 (Tex. C. App) (erection of steam heating apparatus); Bryan v. S. F. Bower & Co., 209 S. W. I8g (Tex.. C. App.)
(installation of gasoline container and pump); General Railway Signal Co.
v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 500 (installing signal devices and equipment for a
railroad) ; Kinnear & Gager Mfg. Co. v. Miner, 89 Vt. 572, g6 Atl. 333 ( erection and installation of building materials).
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business, and which neither incurs nor pays expenses for receiving,
handling, selling or storing its goods, but merely consigns them to
another factor (whether a corporation or not), who does all the
above business, is not "doing business" within the state.158
Tm~ GENERAL PowER oF THE STATE To

T A'.X

PROPERTY AND

ITS RELATION TO THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

It is a well recognized principle that a state possesses the power
to tax property within its own jurisdiction. Such a tax on property
becaus·e of its being within a state's borders must be distinguished
accurately from such other taxes, with which we have already dealt,
as taxes laid on transportation or on occupations, whether of an
individual or a corporation. The question then naturally arises
where and when is this restricted by the commerce clause. The fact
that the property is used in interstate commerce is in itself no bar
to state taxation,1 59 and the fundamental test which should be
applied is whether or not the property is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the state.16Q On the other hand, a tax; may not
be placed on such property because it is used in interstate commerce,161 as this would act as a burden upon such commerce. This
15 s Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. U. S. Rubber Co. (C. C. A., 8th Cir.), 156
Fed. I In this case it was stated that certain exceptions had been established to the doctrine of Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, which it designated
as three: (I) Every corporation, empowered by the state of its creation to
engage in interstate commerce, may carry on that commerce in sound and
recognized articles of commerce in every state of the Union, and obstructions and prohibitions to this by other states are unconstitutional and void.
(2) Every corporation of every state which is in the employ of the United
States has the right to exercise necessary corporated powers and to transact
the requisite business to discharge duties of that employment in every other
state of the Union without let or hindrance from the latter. (3) Every corporation has the right to institute suits in federal courts and to remove to
these courts its suits in any other state on terms prescribed by acts of Congress.
1 59 Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. I.
160 This test seems to have prevailed in the minds of the court in regard
to the decision reached in Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, II4 U. S. 196.
1 6 1 Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160 (here Justice
Brewer collects all the decisions on this subject, eleven in number).
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latter tax savors of a privilege tax as contradistinguished from the
property tax. The line between the two is often very difficult to
determine, and is determined mainly by the amount of the tax,
whether excessive or not, or whether equal and uniform as required
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The test then is situs,162 but situs itself is hard to determine
where property is continually moving from state to state. An artificial situs has been created by congressional action163 for vessels
engaged in interstate commerce, which is the port nearest to which the owner or acting manager resides. The vessel is taxable here
in the absence of an actual situs anywhere else, such as where it is
engaged wholly within the limits of a state.164 Thus, a vessel
engaged in commerce between two states, discharging its cargo at
their ports, is taxable by neither if enrolled in a third state.165 A
ferry company is likewise immune from a property tax on its boats
in one state if they are situated in another. 166
Bridges are also taxable, even though Congress has declared that
railway bridges over navigable streams shall be regarded as post
roads. 167 vVhere the bridge connects two states, each state may tax
that part of the bridge within its jurisdictio~. 168
In regard to rolling stock, which is used and employed within the
state, but where the various items are continually changing, the doctrine applied is that of "average habitual use," namely, that the
162 Thus, a state can tax grain elevators, although the grain in them is
to be shipped without the state. Cargill & Co. v. Minnesota, l8o U. S. 452,
and Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504- Again, the mere intention to export
cannot relieve tobacco before its removal from taxation. Turpin v. Burgess,
n7 U. S. 504. (It will be noticed that here the docttrine of Coe v. Errol,
n6 U. S. 517, as to intent of manufacturer to ship, is adopted.)
163 Rl;VISED STATUTES, U. S., Section 4141.
1 61 Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299 (taxable by
Virginia because it was engaged in commerce therein, although enrolled in
another state).
165 Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 5g6; Morgan v. Parham,
16 Wall. 471.
166 St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., I I Wall. 423; Gloucester Ferry Co
v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 1g6.
1'17 Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692; Hendersor
Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150.
166 Keokuk, etc., Bridge Co. v. Illinois, 175 U. S. 626.
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average number of cars, whether or not owned by a foreign corporation, employed as vehicles of interstate transportation are taxable.169 This applies equally to refrigerator cars,17° ordinary passenger and freight cars171 and sleeping cars.172 Where the plaintiff
makes no objection to the correctness of the number of his cars
that were assessed by the state officials, the presumption indulged
in by the courts is that this number is correct.173 In regard to railroads, telegraph lines, and telephone lines where the whole system
extends through many different states and forms an organic unity,
the doctrine of a "mileage basis" has been employed. Here such
part of the valuation of the entire stock is _taken for assessment purposes as the length of the line operated within the state is proportional to the entire length.174 The real estate and machinery of the
company, which are both subject to local taxation, are excluded
and the market value of the shares of the company's stock may be
taken for fixing the valuation of its entire property.175 Many objections are raised to this method, such as that the valuation is based
on property beyond the authority of the state to tax. But in general, if the preliminary total valuation be correct, and the different
parts of the line may be assumed to be equal in value, no terminals
in one.state being equal in value to all the rest of the line through
another state,176 the final result achieved will fairly represent the
value of such part of the line.177
It has been said before that no tax can be laid on property because
it is engaged in interstate commerce : otherwise, if such a tax par169 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U. S. 149·
11°
171

Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U. S. 149.
Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 127 U. S. II7.
172 Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18.
1 7 3 Union Refrigerator Co. v. Lynch, 177 U. S. 149.
174 Cleveland, Cincinnati & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 439.
1 7 s Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart et,al., 163 U. S. 1.
176 As was said by Mr. Justice Holmes in Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490.
1 7 7 In arriving at the average habitual use of sleeping cars in Pullman
Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, there was taken such proportion of its capital stock as the number of miles of railroad over which the
company's cars were run in that state bore to the whole number of miles
traversed by them altogether. Also, in regard to an express company, the
value of its property within the state was determined by a similar application of the unit rule in Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.
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takes of a charge for special facilities. Thus, wharfage fees for
vessels engaged in navigation are allowable,178 as well as municipal
taxation of poles and wires belonging to a telegraph company, which
was in the nature of a rental for the use of their streets,179 as also
ta."'{ation where local government supervision is charged for. 180 It
is immaterial 1whether such fees as wharfage are unreasonable, and
relief must be sought in such cases for invoking the laws of the
states, since the federal courts possess no power.181 But when such
fees are merely a disguise to control commerce182 or discriminate183 ,
against products of other states, relief is granted. Unreasonableness, on the other hand, has been declared sufficient for declaring
invalid charges for special facilities afforded because of local government supervision.184
We tum now to the question of the taxation of property acquired
through interstate commerce, such as the earnings or receipts of a
company engaged in such commerce, which are collectively spoken
of as gross receipts. Gross receipts, a part of which are derived
from commerce, have proved a vexatious question to the courts,185
S. 194- In this case Mr. Justice Brewer was particitlarly vehement in
upholding the theory, saying that "no finespun theories about situs should
interfere to enable these large corporations, whose business is carried on
through many states, to escape from bearing in each state such burden of
taxation as a fair distribution of the actual value of their property among
those states requires."
11s Northwestern U;iion Packet Co. v. St. Louis, loo U. S. 423, sustaining
a wharfage fee laid by a municipal corporation.
179 St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92.
180 Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 100; Charlotte, Columbia, etc., R R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386.
181 Ouachita & Mississippi Packet Co. v. Aiken et al., 121 U. S. 444182 Southern Steamship Co. v. Wardens of New Orleans declaring invalid
a law imposing the sum of $5 upon each vessel entering' the port for the
masters and wardens of that port.
183 Guy v. Baltimore, loo U. S. 434. holding invalid a provision for collecting wharfage from vessels landing goods other than the production of
the state, while exempting all other vessels.
184 Western Union Tel. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U. S. 419.
_ 185 For example, compare the decision of the court in State Tax on
Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284, where tax by Pennsylvania upon the gross
receipts of a railroad company was sustained on the ground that the tax,
being collectible only once in six months, was laid upon a fund which has
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but of recent years it has been definitely established that such a tax
is an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce, and as such
is invalid. 186 Thus, laws of various states taxing companies engaged
in interstate commerce at a certain percentage upon their gross
receipts have been declared invalid.187 Receipts derived from the
pursuit of purely intrastate commerce are taxable,188 even where
the route traversed goes partly outside the state.189 Where a company derives its earnings partly from internal and partly from interstate commerce, the two may be separated, and a state may tax that
part arising from internal commerce, 190 and if a state shall place a
tax upon gross receipts the whole law will not be declared invalid,
but only so much as applies to receipts derived from interstate commerce.191 Another method which has been employed and declared
become part of the general property of the company, with Philadelphia, etc.,
Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, where a tax imposed upCX11 the
gross receipts of a steamship company derived from transportation was
declared invalid, and Mr. Justice Bradley admitted that the doctrine of the
former case was no longer tenable.
1 86 Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Botkin, 240 U. S. 227: "A state
cannot lay a tax on interstate commerce i:n any form by imposing it either
upon the business which constitutes interstate commerce, or the privilege of
engaging in it, or upon the receipts as such derived from it." This position
first found utterance in Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230.
187 Galveston, H. & S. A.· R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (declaring
invalid the Texas act of April 17, 1905, laying a tax "equal to l per centum
of their gross receipts" as applied to railway companies); Meyer v. WellsFargo & Co., 223 U. S. 298 (declaring gross revenue tax law of Oklahoma,
1910, is inapplicable to a non-resident express company whose receipts are
largely derived from interstate commerce and investment in bonds and land
outside the state).
lSBFargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Alabama
State Board of Assessment (Western Union Tel. Co. v. Seay), 132 U. S. 473.
1 8 9 United States Exp. Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335; Lehigh Valley
R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192 (no breaking of bulk or transfer of
passengers in the other state).
190 Ohio River & W. R. Co. v. Dittey, 232 U. S. 576.
191 United States Exp. Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335; Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Alabama State Bd. of Assessment, 132 U. S. 473; Ratterman v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 127 U. S. 4u. In cases where the interpretation
of the effect of such an act is in doubt the court will follow the interpretation
laid down by the supreme court of the state. Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U.

s. 23.
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valid is imposing the tax upon the receipts of a railroad company
ascertained by dividing the gross transportation receipts by the total
number of units operated, thus obtaining the average gross receipts
per mile, then multiplying this by the number of miles operated
within the state and calling this the receipts derived from internal
commerce.192 A state may make a corresponding increase in the
tax decimal upon intrastate earnings so as to counterbalance the
amount excluded because of its interstate character.193 A tax
imposed upon a manufacturing company and measured by the
amount of sales of goods manufactured in the local factory, whether
sold within or without, either in domestic or interstate commerce,
is not an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce,194 such
taxes being upon an occupation195 and not upon the fact of commerce. On the other hand, a tax based upon gross receipts for
merchandise shipped to other countries is invalid.196
Princeton, New Jersey.
J. M. LANDIS.
192 Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217.
This is certainly a
more profitable proposition from the viewpoint of the state, unless the greater
portion of receipts be derived from internal commerce.
1 93 Though the opposite was intimated in Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car
Co., 191 U. S. 171, the above propositicm. was held valid in Ohio River & W.
R. Co. v. Dittey, 232 U. S. 576.
19 4 American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459. In accord
is U .S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 329.
195 Clark v. Titusville, 184 U. S. 329.
196 Crew-Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292.

